Ehrman
begins chapter three of his book, Jesus before the Gospels, referring to
a staged event that occurred in 1902. In this event, “a well-known
criminologist named von Liszt was delivering a lecture when an argument broke
out. One student stood up and shouted that he wanted to show how the topic was
related to Christian ethics” (Ehrman 87). A fight ensured, a gun was drawn, and
while Professor von Liszt tried to intervene, the gun when off (Ehrman 87). The
professor then called the class to order assuring them that the whole scene had
been staged as a test of observation and memory. Some students were then asked
to write immediately about the event. Others wrote the next day or a week
later. Still others were deposed under cross examination. Ehrman then reports
that “The most accurate accounts were in error in 26 percent of the details
reported. Others were in error as many as 80 percent” (Ehrman, 88). Ehrman concludes
that “eyewitnesses are notoriously inaccurate” (Ehrman 88).
Ehrman got
this story from a book by Elizabeth Loftus (Eyewitness Testimony, 2nd
ed. Cambridge, MA : Harvard Univ. p 20-21). Loftus was quoting from someone
named Hugo Munsterberg (On the Witness Stand. New York : Doubleday,
1908; 49-51), and Munsterberg was recalling the event which had been staged by
professor von Liszt six years earlier. Unfortunately, Munsterberg gave no
further detail on this study so it is difficult to know what to make of the
statistics cited. For example, Ehrman didn’t happen to mention that in this
study, any “Omissions… wrong additions and alterations” were counted as
mistakes (Loftus 20-21). But in recounting any event, different parts of the
event may stand out to, and be emphasized by, different people. The fact that
two or more people should omit parts of the whole may be due to factors other
than memory. Without knowing more about what was omitted or added, or the
nature of the alterations, the statistics are not much good.
It would
have also been helpful to know what percent of the gist of the story students
got accurate. Students undoubtedly got
details wrong, but did any students remember the event entirely differently?
Did anyone think the professor shot the student? Did anyone think both students
were shot? Did anyone say there was no gunshot at all? My guess is that the
gist of the event could have been reconstructed quite well from the eyewitness
accounts even though minor details would vary from student to student.
Nevertheless, Ehrman uses the story to make the point that “eyewitnesses are
notoriously inaccurate” (Ehrman 88).
As an aside,
it may also be worth noting that Ehrman is trusting Loftus’ summary of Munsterberg’s
memory of von Liszt’s eyewitness account in an effort to show that memory can’t
be trusted!
Another
study cited by Ehrman related to the crash of an El-Al Boing 707 (Ehrman 89-91).
Ehrman cites a study by psychologists Hans Crombag, Willem Wagenaar and Peter
Van Koppen regarding a Boeing 707 that crashed into an apartment near Amsterdam
in October of 1992 (Hans. F.M. Crombag, Willem A. Wagenaar, and Peter J. Van
Koppen, “Crashing Memories and the Problem of ‘Source Monitoring,” Applied
Cognitive Psychology, 10, 1996: 95-104).
Ten months
after the crash, Crombag and his colleagues surveyed 193 university faculty,
staff and students about the accident. Specifically, participants in the survey
filled out a questionnaire which asked, “Did you see the television film of the
moment the plane hit the apartment building?” (Ehrman 90; Crombag 99). Of the
107 who responded, 55% said yes. Later another questionnaire was given to 93
law students. Ehrman relates that “In this instance 62 (66 percent) of the
respondents indicated that they had seen the film. There was just one problem.
There was no film” (Ehrman 90). Ehrman concludes that “they were imagining it,
based on logical inferences…” (Ehrman 91).
What Ehrman
doesn’t mention—and what is only relegated to a footnote in Crombag’s article—
is the fact that “some networks showed a schematic computer animation of the
movements of the plane between take-off and the moment of impact” (Crombag 95
n.1). A television computer animation could legitimately be considered “a
television film.” So those who said they saw the television film were not
necessarily mis-remembering a non-existent film. They may have thought the
questionnaire was referring to the television computer animation film which did,
in fact, exist and was shown on TV. Even though this film “did not show how the
plane crashed” it did show “the movements of the plane between take-off and the
moment of impact (Crombag, 95 n.1). The existence and airing of the computer
animation on TV calls this entire study into question.
The possibility
that those taking the questionnaire thought they were being asked about the
computer animation is supported by the fact that the researchers were actually
puzzled by the fact that it would be very improbable that a video would exist
of the actual impact (the study was obviously before 911). They wrote, “only
very little critical sense would have made our subjects realize that the
implanted information could not possibly be true. We are still at a loss as to
why so few of them realized this” (Crombag 103). It is actually quite easy to
explain. Those taking the questionnaire thought they were being asked about the
television animation film they had seen.
A follow-up
study regarding the crash asked more specific questions, for example whether
the plane was burning when it crashed, or whether it came in nose up, nose down
or vertically, etc. (Crombag 100). Some who answered the questions admitted
they had not seen the TV film of the crash. The researchers concluded that “The
fact that in Study 2 many of the respondents answered the ‘memory’ questions’
after having admitted that they had not seen the (nonexisting) TV film
indicates that they thought that all that mattered was getting it right” (103).
The
researchers fail to realize, however, that this also undermines their study.
The respondents simply misunderstood what they were being asked. They
apparently thought this was a survey about what happened—and they pieced
together what happened from memory of the extensive TV coverage of the
aftermath of the crash. They were really being asked about what they personally
remembered seeing on a television film.
One of the
points made in this article was that “Witnesses in legal trials must therefore
be explicitly reminded that they can only testify as to what they know
first-hand” (Crombag 103). Those who did the study should have followed their
own advice. Were the respondents in Crombag’s study “explicitly reminded” that
they were only to answer very specifically regarding what they had actually
seen on a TV video (not an animation) of the actual crash—not what they
inferred to have happened from videos of the aftermath? There is no way of
knowing, therefore, whether these questionnaires were measuring memory or
interpretation.
This study was a good reminder for those conducting court
trials but has little relevance to historical studies. No one doubts that
eyewitnesses get details wrong. What matters is the big picture or “gist” of
the story. While the details in Crombag’s study varied, no one to our knowledge
questioned the big picture, i.e. that a large plane (not a train or truck) did
hit a building (not a soccer stadium) near Amsterdam (not Paris or London) and
the result was chaos and disaster!
